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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ONE STEP AWAY: HOW HERNÁNDEZ II SIGNALS THE
ELIMINATION OF BIVENS
“[T]he liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.” 1
In light of the newest decision on the Bivens doctrine in Hernández v. Mesa
(Hernández II), 2 the Supreme Court appears to be on the precipice of eliminating
Bivens claims altogether. The elimination of Bivens claims is even being
explicitly called for by two of the Justices. 3 Bivens claims are damages claims
for constitutional violations that are implied; the damages are implied because
they have not been created by Congress but are assumed to exist through
constitutional interpretation. 4 The implications of such a move would be
shocking to many people.
Bivens claims serve a vital role in protecting the U.S. Constitution. The
nature of Bivens claims means that Congress has not acted to authorize a remedy
and state claims are not generally possible due to preemption, therefore there is
no other course of action to remedy a constitutional violation; in Justice Harlan’s
words “its damages or nothing.” 5 Furthermore, Bivens claims provide a
necessary deterrent to constitutional violations from federal officers. 6 Without
the availability of Bivens claims to remedy constitutional violations by federal
officers, such officers would have near-limitless ability to violate constitutional
rights. Indeed, the earliest Bivens cases show just how necessary these claims
are. In Carlson, an inmate at a federal prison suffered serious injuries and died
when the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical
concern. 7 In Bivens itself, the plaintiff claimed to have “suffered great
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering” at the hands of federal

1. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, A LIVING BILL OF RIGHTS 64 (1961).
2. See generally Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández II), 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
3. Id. at 750–53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 741.
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 389, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); William Baude, Bivens Liability and Its Alternatives, SUMMARY,
JUDGMENT.COM (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.summarycommajudgment.com/blog/a-fewthoughts-about-bivens-liability [https://perma.cc/9HWG-2EPF] (“What Justice Thomas does not
note is that it has become very hard to bring those suits under state law either.”).
6. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (“Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable
against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United
States”).
7. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
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officers for an illegal search and seizure. 8 In both of these cases, it was clear that
if state officials had committed the same action, claims would have been viable
under § 1983. 9 Under § 1983 claims, state officials are held responsible for
violations of federal constitutional rights. 10 These claims serve as an important
deterrent to rampant abuses by federal officials.
Due to prior Supreme Court decisions, citizens are already unable to bring
claims against federal officials for policy choices they enact. 11 If the Court were
to eliminate Bivens claims altogether, then there would likely be many scenarios
in which individuals would have no legal recourse against a government which
oversteps its boundaries. The individual could not sue the officials who created
a policy that violates constitutional rights, nor could they sue the federal official
who carries out such a policy. To go even further, the individual would also have
no protection against a federal official who violates both an official policy as
well as an individual’s constitutional rights.
For example, if an FBI agent took an action that clearly violated FBI policy
and the federal constitution, and a suspect dies, the family of that suspect would
have no recourse against that agent. If the actions were not a violation of a
criminal statute, the most that could occur would be that the officer would be
fired. This is unacceptable. The absurdity of such a system that would allow for
violations to be brought against state officials who violate federal constitutional
rights but not against federal officials who violate those same rights is
astounding. While some of the blame certainly lies with Congress, here, it is
important to note that Congress alone is not responsible for protecting
constitutional rights. 12 The arbitrariness of such decisions certainly makes no
legal sense and the Supreme Court should reverse its current path.
In this Note, I will establish the need for a new test for Bivens claims to
ensure constitutional rights are protected for all individuals. In Section I, I will
outline the current Bivens jurisprudence by looking at how the Supreme Court,
both the majority and minority, analyzed the facts of the Hernández claims. In
Section II, I will analyze Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, in which he calls
for the elimination of Bivens claims altogether. In Section III(a), I examine the
dissent written by Justice Ginsburg through the lens provided by Justice
Brennan’s lecture In Defense of Dissent to analyze how the dissent fails to
8. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90. (“The agents manacled petitioner in front of his wife and
children, and threatened to arrest the entire family. They searched the apartment from stem to stern.
Thereafter, petitioner was taken to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated,
booked, and subjected to a visual strip search.”).
9. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 25 (“[a] state official contemplating illegal activity must always be
prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him.”).
10. Id.
11. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017) (holding that Bivens claims could not
be brought against policy makers).
12. See infra Section III(b).
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challenge the majority opinion or announce a greater constitutional
understanding. As such, in subsection III(b), I offer a dissent that would meet
the goals set out by Justice Brennan for quality dissents.
I. UNDERSTANDING BIVENS THROUGH HERNÁNDEZ II
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the
Supreme Court established the right to bring constitutional claims under the
Fourth Amendment against federal officials for search and seizure violations,
despite there being no congressionally-established claim. 13 Congress had not,
and still has not, created legislation authorizing the courts to award punitive
damages for violations of constitutional rights by federal officers, thus it is an
implied claim that the Supreme Court authorized. 14
In creating the cause of action, the Supreme Court noted that exercises of
federal authority are unique in that they cannot be overridden by the states in
many cases, or even subject to state oversight. 15 Often citizens have nowhere
else to go but the court system when federal officers abuse their power. 16 The
Court relied, in Bivens, on the well-known line from Chief Justice Marshall’s
decision in Marbury v. Madison, “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives injury” to drive home the point that the courts must be a
place of refuge for those injured by federal officials’ actions. 17 Therefore, the
courts must be “alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief.” 18 In the case of Bivens, where no other form of relief would have
protected the individual citizens and there were “no special factors counseling
hesitation,” 19 the Supreme Court established the right to sue for damages for
implied constitutional violations. 20 The Court even noted that its holding should
not be surprising, as “[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary
remedy for the invasion of personal interests in liberty.” 21
With the Court’s ruling in Bivens, an implied constitutional claim against
federal officers, known as the Bivens claim, was born. The Court would go on
13. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 392–94.
16. Id. at 394–95.
17. Id. at 397 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
18. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392.
19. Id. at 396–97 The “special factors counseling hesitation” the Supreme Court discussed
were whether there was a question of federal fiscal policy or cases where constitutional rights were
not an issue. The Court dismissed any concerns by noting that in a suit where the U.S. was
attempting to recover lost wages of a soldier that Congress is quite adept “where the federal purse
was involved,” therefore, no cause of action need be carved out in that case, unlike in Bivens. Id.
20. Id. at 390, 397.
21. Id. at 395.
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to expand the Bivens doctrine to cover the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in the form of gender discrimination in employment 22 and the
Eighth Amendment in the form of prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a
serious medical concern. 23
After the short-lived, initial expansion of the Bivens Doctrine the court
began to slowly limit Bivens without any direct overturning of the doctrine. 24 In
Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Kennedy laid out the current state of the Bivens
Doctrine in great detail. 25 The Court in Hernández II, however, cut through
much of Kennedy’s dicta to give a clearer view of the current test that exists for
Bivens claims. 26
A.

Hernández II—Facts

The facts of the Hernández case are, as the Court put it, “tragic.” 27 Sergio
Adrián Hernández Güereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican boy, and a group of
friends were running down the middle of a dried-out culvert that acts as the
Mexican-U.S. border and separates El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico,
on June 7, 2010. 28 According to the complaint, the boys were running across the
culvert and up the embankment on the U.S. side and touching the border fence
before running back to the other side. 29 Shortly thereafter, Border Patrol Agent
Jesus Mesa, Jr. arrived on his bicycle and detained one of Hernández’s friends. 30
Hernández ran to the Mexican side of the border and Mesa fired two shots, one

22. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229–31, 234 (1979).
23. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).
24. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (refusing to extend Bivens protections under
the First Amendment to federal employees who speak out against their agency in public
statements); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (refusing to extend Bivens protections for
race discrimination claims against military officers); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 672–
73 (1987) (refusing to extend Bivens protections for substantive due process suit against military
officials); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988) (refusing to extend Bivens protections
for substantive due process suit against Social Security officials); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
473–74 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens protections for procedural due process suit against a
federal agency for wrongful termination); Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68
(2001) (refusing to extend Bivens protections for Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison
operator); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547–48 (2007) (refusing to extend Bivens protections
for due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management); Minneci v. Pollard,
565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (refusing to extend Bivens protections for Eighth Amendment suit against
prison guards at a private prison).
25. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854–58 (2017).
26. See generally Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández II), 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
27. Id. at 739.
28. Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández I), 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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of which hit Hernández in the face and killed the boy. 31 Hernández’s family
brought Bivens claims against Agent Mesa for violating Hernández’s Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights. 32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari before
remanding the case back to the Fifth Circuit to be re-analyzed in light of Abbasi,
which was being considered at the same time. 33 The Fifth Circuit held that
Hernández’s claims constitute an improper extension of Bivens and dismissed
the claims. 34 The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and released its
opinion, referred to here as Hernández II. 35
B.

Current State of Bivens Claims

To fully understand the Court’s analysis, one must understand how the socalled “conservative wing” 36 of the Court views Bivens claims. The majority
opinion, borrowing from Abbasi, noted “that expansion of Bivens is disfavored
judicial activity.” 37
The basis of marking the expansion of Bivens a “disfavored judicial activity”
was best stated in Justice Thomas’s Hernández II Concurrence:
Our continued adherence to even a limited form of the Bivens doctrine appears
to “perpetuat[e] a usurpation of the legislative power.” Federal courts lack the
authority to engage in the distinctly legislative task of creating causes of action
for damages to enforce federal positive law. We have clearly recognized as much
in the statutory context. I see no reason for us to take a different approach if the
right asserted to recover damages derives from the Constitution, rather than from
a federal statute. Either way, we are exercising legislative power vested in
Congress. 38

31. Id. It should be noted that for the sake of this case, the only story that matters is what is
alleged in the complaint. However, the Department of Justice investigation claims that Hernández
was engaged in smuggling and threw rocks at Mesa. This version of events is put into doubt by a
cellphone video of the shooting that seems to show Hernández running away from Mesa and not
throwing any rocks. CNN Wire Staff, Youth Fatally Shot By Border Agent Had Smuggling Ties,
Official Says, CNN, (June 10, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/10/texas.border.patrol.
shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/6FZA-A2DC].
32. Hernández I, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.
33. Id. at 2008.
34. Hernández v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018).
35. See generally Hernández v. Mesa (Hernández II), 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
36. See Taylor K. Brown, The US Supreme Court: Who are the justices?, BBC NEWS (Nov.
30, 2018) https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33103973 [https://perma.cc/U4EZ-XY7L]
(stating that Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, and Chief Justice Roberts are conservatives and
noting that Justice Thomas’s “originalism,” though I think it is safe to put him in the conservative
wing of the Supreme Court.).
37. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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In Thomas’s opinion, as well as the rest of the conservative majority’s view, the
act of making a remedy to rectify a constitutional violation where Congress did
not do so is a quintessentially legislative act.
The majority believes there is a separation-of-powers issue in creating such
a “legislative” remedy, because creating a remedy is a legislative task. In the
conservative majority’s view, when the Court engages in such activity it is
encroaching on the legislature’s constitutional duties. 39 The Court on several
occasions has asked the question, in the Bivens context, “who should decide?”
and then answered that “most often” it will be for Congress to decide. 40 The
Court notes that lawmaking involves balancing interests and often demands
compromise. Therefore, the unwillingness to create a remedy for constitutional
violations is a choice that Congress made and one the courts should respect
because Congress is “best positioned” to decide “the extent to which[] monetary
and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees
of the Federal Government based upon constitutional torts.” 41 Therefore, the
Court found that it would be a separation-of-powers violation to step in and
create a remedy.
Despite the underlying belief of the Court, a majority did not believe that
Bivens should be overturned outright, at least not at the moment. 42 The Court in
Hernández II was silent on why Bivens claims should be preserved, though
Thomas hints at stare decisis as the reason. 43 The Court explained this to a
greater degree in Abbasi, stating that Bivens is “settled law” for the three areas
it had been previously approved and noted that reliance on it is a “powerful
reason[] to retain it in that sphere.” 44
Because of these underlying principles of separation-of-powers and stare
decisis, the Court has fashioned a test designed to maintain Bivens claims for the
three areas that the Court had previously recognized 45 but limit the ability of
plaintiffs to otherwise bring claims. The test applied to determine the
applicability of a Bivens claim is: first, determine if there is a constitutional
39. Id. at 742 (“The Constitution grants legislative power to Congress; this Court and the lower
federal courts, by contrast, have only ‘judicial Power.’ Art. III. § 1.”).
40. Id. at 750; Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
380 (1983).
41. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See infra Section II for greater discussion on this point.
43. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 750.
44. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
45. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) (holding that Bivens applied in Fourth Amendment claims against federal officials for search
and seizure violations); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229–31, 234 (1979) (holding that Bivens
applied in Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment claims regarding gender discrimination in
employment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (holding that Bivens applied in Eighth
Amendment claims regarding prison officials’ deliberate indifference to a serious medical
concern).
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claim; second, determine if the claim arises in a new context; and third,
determine if there are any special factors that counsel hesitation. 46
a.

Step Zero: A Constitutional Claim

First the courts may look at the actual claim and see if there is a
constitutional violation. 47 In Hernández II, the court was silent on the question
of whether there was a colorable constitutional claim, though it had previously
stated that such an analysis “is appropriate in many cases.” 48 Because of the
gatekeeper nature of such an analysis, I refer to it as step zero. 49 The inherent
nature of a Bivens claim is that a right given to the plaintiff by the Constitution
has been infringed. 50 The courts, therefore, may determine if a constitutional
right exists to determine if a Bivens analysis is even required. 51 It is undeniable
that a claim of infringed constitutional rights cannot proceed absent a specific
constitutional right being infringed.
b.

Step One: A New Context

The first step of a Bivens analysis (after the Step Zero: Constitutional Claim
Step) is determining whether the claim arises in a “new context.” 52 A claim that
does not present a new context may automatically proceed. 53
If a claim is “different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases”
decided by the Supreme Court, then a new context is present. 54 Hernández II
elaborated on this standard by stating that this analysis must dig deeper than just
looking at whether the current claim is brought under the same constitutional
provision as a previous claim. 55 In Abbasi, Justice Kennedy laid out some
examples for the Court’s meaningful variation test, though the examples were
by no means meant to be exhaustive:
46. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857; Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 743–44.
47. The Supreme Court noted in Hernández I that this test is not required therefore it may be
utilized. Hernández I, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
48. Id.
49. Determining the applicability of a constitutional right is technically a prelude to any Bivens
analysis. Id.
50. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
51. See Hernández I, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017).
52. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 743.
53. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
54. Id. at 1859–60.
55. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 743.
A claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision
as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously recognized. Compare
Carlson (allowing Bivens remedy for an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide
adequate medical treatment), with Malesko (declining to create a Bivens remedy in similar
circumstances because the suit was against a private prison operator, not federal officials).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers
involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the
official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should
respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other
legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive
intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence
of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider. 56

When it comes to the “new context” test even a “modest extension” of Bivens is
still considered an extension. 57
The majority’s scant analysis of whether the claims arise in a new context
in Hernández II essentially stated that there is “a world of difference” between
the previously accepted claims (an unconstitutional search and seizure in Bivens
and the unconstitutional sex discrimination in Davis) and the cross-border
shooting present in Hernández II, and left it at that. 58
The Ginsburg’s dissent accepted the same framework for analyzing Bivens
claims that the majority used. 59 However, Ginsburg believed that this case did
not arrive in a new context. 60 The Supreme Court has previously accepted claims
for unconstitutional seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment as a way of
deterring officers from such violations. 61 Furthermore, in a non-Bivens context
the Court has found that using more force than is necessary constitutes an
unreasonable seizure. 62 Ginsburg also noted that the offending officer was on
U.S. soil when he fired the shot. 63 Therefore, in Ginsburg’s view, the only
difference between this case and Bivens is the place where the bullet landed (i.e.
where the harm occurred). 64 “It scarcely makes sense for a remedy trained on
deterring rogue officer conduct to turn upon a happenstance subsequent to the
conduct—a bullet landing in one half of a culvert, not the other.” 65
The difference in the way the majority and the dissent looked at this issue is
illuminating. While Ginsburg’s dissent did not need to stretch too far to show
the facts of Hernández II did not occur in a new context, it was still further than
the majority was willing to stretch. When the Court says even a “modest
extension” of Bivens is an extension, it seems that any new element that could

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(1971).
62.
63.
64.
65.

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
Id. at 1864.
Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 744.
Id. at 753 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 756.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 755 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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possibly be used to distinguish a claim from any of three contexts the Court
recognizes will be an extension into a new context.
c.

Step Two: Special Factors Counseling Hesitation

If the claim presents a new context, the court then must determine if any
special factors counsel hesitation. 66 The requirement that there be no special
factors counseling hesitation before allowing a claim to proceed comes from the
original Bivens case and runs through its progeny to the modern Bivens
analysis. 67 Despite the Supreme Court’s extensive history with Bivens
jurisprudence, 68 the Court has never precisely defined what special factors
counseling hesitation actually means. 69 However, the current Supreme Court
jurisprudence has articulated the standard that “the inquiry must concentrate on
whether the judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction,
to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to
proceed.” 70
The limits of the special factors counselling hesitation analysis are
unknown. 71 Though the fact that the Court still requires the analysis implies that
it must do some work, I am not sure this is the actual case. Since Abbasi
announced a clearer, anti-extension standard for analyzing Bivens claims, the
Court has yet to deny a proposed special factor counselling hesitation. 72 When
Hernández was in the 5th Circuit, the majority stated that the “newness of the
‘new context’” alone should require the claims be dismissed in light of the
disfavored status of extending Bivens claims into a new context and the “strict
limitations arising from the constitutional imperative of the separation of
powers.” 73 While the Supreme Court does not endorse this view, it also does not

66. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 744.
67. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971);
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017).
68. Since Bivens was originally decided in 1971, there have been 133 Supreme Court cases
that cite to it. Citing References to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, WESTLAW (Mar. 13, 2020), https://1.next.westlaw.com. (search for “Bivens” and enter
case, click Citing References, then limit the Jurisdiction to Federal, and then Supreme Court).
69. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857.
70. Id. 1857–58.
71. Though Anya Bernstein has attempted to tie the “special factors counselling hesitation” in
Bivens claims to congressional will, I am not convinced that this analysis survived the Abbasi and
Hernández II decisions, which came out after this analysis. Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will
and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND.
L. REV. 719, 720 (2012).
72. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–65; Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. 735, 744–45 (2020).
73. Hernández v. Mesa, 855 F.3d at 811, 818 (5th Cir. 2018).
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repudiate it. 74 Under the current Bivens jurisprudence, there is possibly, even
likely, no limit to special factors that counsel hesitation, short of rationality. 75
In Hernández II, the Court began its special factors analysis with foreign
relations. 76 The Court stated that this issue is one between the U.S. and Mexico
because “[a] cross-border shooting is by definition an international incident” that
asked the court to arbitrate between the United States and Mexico. 77 The Court
went on to discuss the U.S. and Mexico’s views and responses to the incident. 78
In Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, she argued that the majority had been “led astray
. . . by empty labels.” 79 Ginsburg argued that because there could be no harmful
effect on foreign relations by allowing the claim to go forward, as Mexico
supported it, the Court was creating the foreign relations issue. 80 The majority
responded to this point directly by stating:
It is no answer to argue, as Mexico does, that refusing to extend Bivens “is what
[would] negatively affect international relations.” Brief for Government of
United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae 12. When a third party intervenes and
takes sides in a dispute between two countries, one country is likely to be pleased
and the other displeased. But no matter which side the third party supports, it
will have injected itself into their relations. 81

Ginsburg seemed to simply disagree, as the dissent said no more on the issue. 82
In regard to the foreign relations discussion, both the majority and the
dissent seemed to get lost in the weeds. First of all, the majority is wrong to state
that allowing a Bivens claim would force them to arbitrate between the U.S. and
Mexico; they are arbitrating between the family of the slain boy and the federal
officer that killed him. Furthermore, the question that the dissent failed to raise,
and the majority failed to address was: how does a U.S. court holding a U.S.
official responsible for violating the U.S. Constitution on U.S. soil raise a foreign
relations issue? 83 Certainly the fact that a foreign national is involved could
implicate foreign relations, but this is no different than if a foreign national was
on U.S. soil when the shooting occurred. It is my contention that a potential
74. See Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 744–45. Although the scope of the special factors analysis
remains an unanswered question, I believe that the conservative majority of Supreme Court will
continue to find any factor presented as a factor that counsels hesitation, so long as they maintain
the current test. See infra Section II for greater discussion on this point.
75. By rationality I mean that the special factor must have some rational basis, denying a claim
where the only factual difference was the name of the plaintiff would, for instance, not be rational.
76. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 744.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 754 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 758.
81. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 745 n.3.
82. Id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. That the family members of the killed boy are not U.S. citizens would not deny them
access to U.S. courts for a federal question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2020).
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foreign relations context should not preclude such a claim precisely because the
courts can hold a U.S. citizen responsible under the U.S. Constitution. 84 The
Court simply used an empty call to foreign relations as distraction from the real
issue: the U.S. Constitution’s reach over federal officers.
The majority opinion next went on to discuss national security issues. 85 The
majority argued that “regulating the conduct of agents at the border
unquestionably has national security implications,” and therefore, “the risk of
undermining border security provides reason to hesitate.” 86 The dissent accused
the majority of invoking national security as a “talisman used to ward off
inconvenient claims.” 87 The majority failed to respond to the dissent’s
accusation but did attempt to respond to a point the Petitioner’s raised, that there
was no national security interest advanced by allowing border patrol agents to
shoot people in the back as they walk on the Mexican side of the border. 88 The
majority argued that the courts should not alter the framework established by the
political branches (the executive and legislative branches) for addressing the
usage of unlawful lethal force. 89 This invariably leads to the question: even if
we are to accept that national security is a valid reason for hesitating in extending
Bivens, 90 how would national security be affected by upholding a basic
constitutional standard that all officers would have to abide by? It is not
uncommon for there to be constitutional limits on police officers, and the public
safety is not adversely effected to the point of allowing police unfettered
authority. Nor should the border patrol, in this instance, be granted unfettered
authority to violate individuals’ constitutional rights. Here, the dissent in this
instance was spot on that the Court is using national security as a “talisman to
ward off inconvenient claims.”
Finally, the majority embarked on an analysis of what it considered
“analogous statutes” to show that when Congress has established damages
remedies, it has “preclude[d] claims for injuries that occurred abroad.” 91 The
heart of the majority’s argument here is analogous with its overall understanding
of Bivens claims: since Congress doesn’t think a protection is necessary here to
protect the constitutional rights, the Court does not have a role in creating such
a protection. The dissent went on to attempt to distinguish each statute and case
84. Whether the actions of a cross-border shooting are a constitutional violation is a question
not addressed in this Note; however, like the Court, I am operating under the assumption that it is
a constitutional violation.
85. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 746-47.
86. Id. at 747.
87. Id. at 758 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017) (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523 (1985)) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 746 (majority opinion).
89. Id.
90. For more on this point, see infra Section III.
91. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 747.
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to show that “[n]one . . . should stand in the plaintiffs’ way.” 92 Each argument
is unable to win over the other side, and I doubt the “analogous statutes” would
be enough to convince the Court without the other special factors counselling
hesitation. Furthermore, this discussion mirrors the discussion on the role of
Congress the majority discussed prior to the “new context/special factors” test. 93
Though the Court did not explicitly say so, Hernández II seemingly
forecloses any extension of Bivens. The Court stated that even a “modest
extension” of Bivens is still considered an extension. 94 Though the limits of this
are not completely known, the Court itself has given the new context analysis a
broad reach. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a scenario where the Court would
deny a special factor counseling hesitation. Similar arguments to the national
security argument could be transferred to any federal government action and it
seems likely the Court would find that it is a special factor counseling hesitation.
Therefore, it is unlikely that, under the current conservative majority, any
extension of Bivens will be permitted.
Although only Justice Gorsuch signed on to Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion, the Court’s broad analysis of “new context” and “special factors
counselling hesitation” suggests that the three justices in the majority who did
not sign on to Thomas’s concurrence (Alito, Roberts, and Kavanaugh) are not
that far away from the concurrence’s position. Section II will address this
further.
II. THOMAS’S DYSTOPIAN FUTURE
In Justice Thomas’s concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, Thomas laid
out an argument that Bivens claims should be eliminated. 95 The majority
expands the reasoning of the current doctrine—that creating a remedy is a
legislative function and for the Court to engage in it would encroach on
Congress’ constitutional responsibilities—to its breaking point. 96 Thomas’s
opinion pushes past this breaking point by taking this argument to its logical
endpoint, that Bivens claims should be eliminated. 97
Thomas succinctly explained how the conservative majority has slowly
worn down Bivens, so that they could eliminate it. “The analysis underlying
Bivens cannot be defended. We have cabined the doctrine’s scope, undermined
its foundation, and limited its precedential value. It is time to correct this Court’s
error and abandon the doctrine altogether.” 98 This has been a sustained effort

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 758–59 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1864 (2017).
Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 750–53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 752–53.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

ONE STEP AWAY

723

from the Court’s conservatives since Bivens claims were originally created. 99
Up until now, the conservatives on the Court have resisted an outright
overturning of Bivens; however, they have used their own misguided precedent
to chip away at it piece by piece. 100 This is not the foundational shift Thomas
attempts to show (the Constitution has not been amended nor has Congress
created a remedy), 101 as much as it is the Court simply moving the goal posts.
While only Gorsuch signed on to Thomas’s concurrence, it remains to be
seen which of the other three conservative justices 102 will follow. Chief Justice
Roberts is well-known for his incremental approach, 103 which may have led him
and the other three conservative justices to only address the extension of Bivens.
Furthermore, Richard Re has pointed out that Roberts Court has engaged in a
pattern he calls “the doctrine of one last chance” in which the Court will “signal
its readiness to impose major disruptions before actually doing so.”104 If this
theory were to play out here, Hernández II would serve as the last warning that
Bivens claims will be overturned altogether. It is possible Thomas sees this
writing on the wall and is, therefore, preparing his colleagues to take the final
step. After all, it is such a small step to take.
Additionally, in the wake of Thomas’s concurrence, it is more likely that a
direct challenge to Bivens will be brought as compared to an attempt to extend
Bivens into a new context. Such a direct challenge to Bivens may force the
99. The separation-of-power concerns that the Court bases its decisions on were cited in the
earliest dissents that created Bivens claims. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 389, 411–12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 53–54 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (discussing race discrimination claims
against military officers); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 672–73 (1987) (discussing
substantive due process suit against military officials); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414
(1988) (discussing a substantive due process suit against Social Security officials); FDIC v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471, 473–74 (1994) (discussing a procedural due process suit against a federal agency for
wrongful termination); Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (discussing
an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison operator); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537,
547–48 (2007) (discussing a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land
Management); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012) (discussing an Eighth Amendment
suit against prison guards at a private prison).
101. See Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 750.
102. These three Justices are Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Brett
Kavanaugh. See Brown, supra note 36.
103. See Richard Wolf, Chief Justice John Roberts Inherits Expanded Role as the Supreme
Court’s Man in the Middle, USA TODAY (Jun. 29, 2018 9:57 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/06/29/chief-justice-john-roberts-supreme-courts-new-man-middle/7432
08002/ [https://perma.cc/96Q8-JPW2], Lawrence Hurley, Spotlight Will be on U.S. Chief Justice
in Trump Trial and in Major Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2019 6:50 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-impeachment-chiefjustice/spotlight-will-be-on-u-s-chief-justice-in-trumptrial-and-in-major-cases-idUSKBN1YO1GU [https://perma.cc/9BY6-K49N].
104. Richard M. Re, 17 Green Bag 2d 173, (2014).
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remaining conservative justices to confront the issue head-on. If the Hernández
II majority were to address a direct challenge to Bivens, they would be able to
use the same reasoning displayed in Hernández II. In such a scenario, it may be
hard to justify the continuance of Bivens.
III. AN ALTERNATE VISION
While the majority continued backing away from protecting constitutional
rights, the dissent merely accepted the same framework for Bivens analysis that
the majority did—that of the Abbasi court. 105 The dissent failed to give voice to
the greater concerns about the protection of constitutional rights that were well
articulated in the original set of decisions. 106 In light of the above established
conclusion that Thomas’s concurrence was a small step past where the majority
opinion landed, the dissent is all the more important to expound upon the failure
of the majority’s reasoning.
A.

Grading Ginsburg’s Dissent

“Writing [a dissent] . . . is not an egoistic act—it is duty. Saying, ‘listen to
me, see it my way, change your mind,’ is not self-indulgence—it is very hard
work that we cannot shirk.” 107 In Justice Brennan’s magnificent lecture entitled
“In Defense of Dissents,” he discussed the reasons for writing dissenting
opinions and what the goal of doing so should be. 108 Looking through the lens
Justice Brennan offers for dissenting opinions, it is clear that Ginsburg’s dissent
failed to meet the lofty goals he set forth. As Justice Brennan stated it, “[d]issent
for its own sake has no value.” 109
Brennan noted that “[in] its most straightforward incarnation, the dissent
demonstrates flaws the author perceives in the majority’s legal analysis.” 110 This
is not done simply to ask the majority to see the dissenters way, but to
“safeguard[] the integrity of the judicial decision-making process by keeping the
majority accountable for the rationale and consequences of its decision.” 111 This
is done through vigorous debate, “forcing the prevailing side to deal with the
hardest questions.” 112

105. See supra Part I.
106. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229–31, 234 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980).
107. See generally William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 438
(1986).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 435.
110. Id. at 430.
111. Id.
112. William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986).
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Ginsburg’s dissent in Hernández II did not seem to demonstrate any major
flaws within the majority’s opinion. The dissent failed to acknowledge, in any
way, the underlying principles that the majority established as the basis of its
analysis. 113 The dissent was quiet on the majority’s assertion that creating a
remedy is a legislative action best suited to Congress, under a separation-ofpowers analysis. 114 The failure to rebut this assertion allowed the majority to
make the assertion unchallenged and easily deny the extension of Bivens through
the previously established test. As a result, it failed to demonstrate very real
flaws that exist within the majority opinion. The dissent, at best, can be said to
simply disagree with the application of Bivens, though it did so without seriously
challenging the majority’s reasoning.
Brennan continued on to list a few more reasons for a judge to dissent:
The dissent is also commonly used to emphasize the limits of a majority decision
that sweeps, so far as the dissenters are concerned, unnecessarily broadly—a sort
of “damage control” mechanism. Along the same lines, a dissent sometimes is
designed to furnish litigants and lower courts with practical guidance—such as
ways of distinguishing subsequent cases. It may also hint that the litigant might
more fruitfully seek relief in a different forum—such as the state courts. 115

Though these are more practical reasons for dissenting, they are important none
the less.
Here again the dissent also failed—most notably, in its inability to
emphasize any limits on the scope of the majority opinion. Though the majority
opinion did not explain the limits of the special factors counselling hesitation
analysis, the dissent was ineffective in establishing any possible limitations and
completely ignored ways in which future cases could be distinguished from the
majority opinion. 116 Also, due to the nature of Bivens claims, identifying
alternate forums is inapplicable. It is clear that the dissent failed to meet any of
the goals Brennan listed here.
To Brennan: “[t]he most enduring dissents, however, are the ones in which
the authors speak, as the writer Alan Barth expressed it, as ‘Prophets with
Honor.’” 117 Brennan explained that “[t]hese are the dissents that often reveal the
perceived congruence between the Constitution and the ‘evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’ and that seek to sow seeds
for future harvest.” 118 An example of such a dissent, given by Brennan, is Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which Harlan is “at once prophetic
and expressive of the Justice’s constitutional vision, and, at the same time, a
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
Brennan, supra note 107, at 430.
See supra Part I.
Brennan, supra note 107, at 430–31.
Id. at 431.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

726

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:711

careful and methodical refutation on the majority’s legal analysis in that
case.” 119 Harlan “spoke not only to his peers, but to his society, and, more
important, across time to later generations.” 120
The dissent in Hernández II failed to meet any of the goals that Brennan set
forth. It appears to be nothing more than dissent for dissent’s sake and in that it
has no value. Certainly not every dissent can reach the heights of Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. However, in the face of increasing hostility to the
constitutional protections that Brennan so eloquently defended in cases like
Bivens, it is not unrealistic to hope the liberal minority 121 would engage in some
rhetoric that expresses a more hopeful constitutional vision than the Court does
here, something that lower courts could grab onto and build on. As Thomas’s
concurrence noted, this is exactly what the conservatives on the Court have been
doing for years and we need look no further than Hernández II to see the success
of such a strategy. 122 The minority has an obligation to give voice to the
constitutional principles being ignored by the majority; not only to push it to
better explain its reasoning, but also to announce new arguments that it hopes
courts in the future will run with. Without doing so the minority is at risk of
losing Bivens claims altogether, as the Thomas concurrence is pushing for.
The minority’s failure to set forth a proper dissent, one worthy of Brennan’s
standard, calls forth the question: what would a proper dissent look like? In the
next subsection I have drafted such a dissent.
B.

The Dissent We Deserved 123
BLAIR, J., dissenting. 124
III

The fundamental objection to extending Bivens lies with the thought that
creating a remedy for a constitutional protection is a legislative function.
Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. ___, ____ (2020) (slip op., at 5). The issue is not
so simple, however. This Court has long recognized the ability to create
remedies to effectuate a statute’s purpose as a legitimate judicial activity. See J.
I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (2001); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. Even as Abbasi seeks to undermine this
reasoning, it recognized that there will be times when creating such a remedy is
119. Id.
120. Id. at 432.
121. This liberal minority is composed of Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Elena Kagan, and Stephen Breyer. See Brown, supra note 36.
122. See supra Section II.
123. Because of the novelty of writing a dissent into a journal note, I am suspending the journal
format for this subsection and using in-text citations.
124. For the sake of this exercise, I will adopt the Sections I and II of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
and not recreate it here. Hernández II, 140 S. Ct. at 753–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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a valid judicial exercise. 582 U.S. at ––––, 137 S.Ct. at 1857. Abbasi asks “who
should decide?” and states that the answer “most often will be Congress.” 582
U.S. at ––––, 137 S.Ct. at 1857. The answer will, therefore, not always be
Congress. Accordingly, it is not a purely legislative task to fashion a remedy.
The judiciary does have a limited role in fashioning remedies when necessary.
The question becomes then: when is it appropriate for the courts to create an
implied remedy for a constitutional violation? This Court in Abbasi, erred when
it stated that separation-of-powers principles meant that the courts should use
caution when extending Bivens. Id. This is not to say that separation-of-power
principles are not important; they most certainly are. Separation-of-power
principles are exactly why this Court should extend Bivens, not why it should
hesitate to do so. The Supreme Court must establish a remedy when the
separation-of-powers duties of the courts require protection.
Blindly acquiescing to Congress, while ignoring the courts’ role in the name
of separation-of-powers violates the spirit of separation-of-powers principles. In
Abbasi, this Court stressed the importance of recognizing Congress’s role in the
constitutional scheme. However, separation-of-powers at its most basic level
gives each branch of government a duty and a role to play, independent of the
other branches. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 463 U.S. 919, 946 (1983) (“[t]he very structure
of the articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III
exemplify the concept of separation of powers”). That the courts have a role to
play in the separation-of-powers scheme is undeniable.
Further, the Founders recognized that the courts had an equal role to play in
protecting constitutional rights. When James Madison presented the Bill of
Rights to Congress he stated:
If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power
in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights.

1 Annals of Cong. 439 (1789).
Important to this discussion is the fact that the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803) (“If then the
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.”). In Marbury, this Court recognized
that when a congressional statute gave it authority that contradicted the
Constitution, the Court had a duty to strike down the statute and follow the
Constitution, thus establishing the concept of judicial review in the courts. Id.
When the courts play their role in the separation-of-powers scheme they must
always remember that the Constitution is supreme.
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Thus, the courts have a duty to protect both the separation-of-powers and
constitutional supremacy principles in order to protect the Constitution. To
protect both principles the Court must recognize implied claims for damages for
every constitutional rights violation that otherwise lacks a remedy.
In many cases of constitutional violations, “it is damages or nothing.”
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410; see also Abbasi, 582 U.S. at ––––, 137 S.Ct. at 1858
(“if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be necessary
to redress past harm and deter future violations”). For those who have been
injured by constitutional violations, especially where someone has been killed,
it is no relief for the courts to order an injunction stopping the action from
happening again. Furthermore, since, as is often the case, the action of
government officials violates policies already in place, the injunction provides
no measure of deterrence. The only way to truly deter constitutional violations
is to allow for a damages remedy.
The Judicial Branch cannot simply leave it to Congress to protect
constitutional rights and turn a blind eye if Congress so refuses. It is an odd thing
to say that if Congress passes an act that allows constitutional violations, the
courts will label it unconstitutional and develop a remedy (most likely
invalidating the law), but if Congress does nothing, which in turn, allows
constitutional violations, the Court will consider itself bound by the
congressional inaction. In reality this is not a respect for the power of Congress
but a gross abdication of this Court’s responsibility to protect constitutional
rights.
As Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed, more than two centuries ago,
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”
Marbury, 1 Cranch at 163. If a constitutional right is dependent upon Congress’s
approval, then that right does not exist. The Bill of Rights, by its very nature and
existence, stands for the proposition that some rights are so important that they
cannot be left up to Congress to approve. They are inherent and exist regardless
of what Congress thinks of them. To limit certain rights because Congress has
not spoken on them is to altogether deny that those rights exist. The Constitution
must be the supreme law of the land and it cannot be supreme if one must seek
congressional approval to exercise it. Where the constitutional rights of
individuals are at issue, the Judiciary must stand as “the guardians of
democracy.”
Therefore, where Congress has failed to protect a constitutional right, either
intentionally or not, it is the duty of the courts to protect that right. This Court
should order a new expansive test for Bivens claims that determines (1) if there
is a constitutional violation, (2) if a remedy exists, (3) if existing remedy is
sufficient to fully protect the constitutional right. Where Congress or the
Executive have not acted or not acted sufficiently to protect constitutional rights,
the court must allow claims for damages.
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IV
Whether Hernández can meet this new standard is unclear. I would reverse
the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remand the case to be decided consistent with
the new test set out here.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state of Bivens claims has never been in greater peril. If Thomas’s
Hernández II concurrence is any indicator, and I believe it is, then Bivens claims
are one step away from elimination. There have been calls for Congress to act; 125
and, certainly, congressional action would be the quickest way to secure these
Constitutional rights. However, even if Congress were to pass a statute creating
an appropriate remedy for this instance, it is still possible that some rights would
not be covered. Therefore, a new test for implied claims for constitutional
violations would still be needed. The Court adopting the test presented here is
the only way to ensure that all constitutional rights are protected. As the draft
dissent showed, the Supreme Court not only has the ability to create an implied
remedy to constitutional violations, it has the duty to do so to protect the
separation-of-powers and constitutional supremacy principles that make up the
foundation of our constitutional scheme.
DANIEL BLAIR *
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